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PROFESSIONAL NOTES 
MERCHANT CREW-REST PROVISIONS SHOULD 
NOT BE APPLIED TO NAVY SHIPS 
By Nita Lewis Shattuck and Panagiotis Matsangas 
R ecently, the National Transpor-tation Safety Board (NfSB) re• leased the findings from its inves• 
tigation of the 2017 collision of the USS 
John S. McCain (DDG-56) and the tanker 
Alnic MC. One of the report's recommen-
dations was that the Navy adopt the crew• 
rest requirements of the Standards of 
Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping 
(STCW) for all ships.' The STCW holds 
that sailors standing navigation and en-
gineering watches must receive a mini• 
mum of IO hours of rest in any 24-hour 
period, and 77 hours of rest in any 7-day 
period. In addition, required rest may be 
divided into no more than two periods in 
any 24-hour period, one of which must be 
at least 6 hours long, and the interval be-
tween consecutive rest periods must not 
exceed 14 hours. Since 2017, the surface 
navy has made improvements to crew-
rest policies, but it has not adopted the 
NTSB-recommended STCW standard. 
Below, we describe the root causes un-
dermining sailor well-being on surface 
vessels, assess the strengths and weak-
nesses of the STCW provisions, and con-
trast STCW provisions with current Navy 
efforts to improve crew endurance and 
operational effectiveness. 
ROOT CAUSES THAT UNDERMINE 
SAILOR WELL-BEING 
In 2001, the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) Crew Endurance Team embarked 
on a multiyear effort to improve oper-
ational effectiveness in the naval en-
vironment through the optimization of 
crew performance. Based on data col• 
lected from more than 35 ships and ap-
proximately 1,700 sailors, NPS identified 
the first major root cause of poor sailor 
well-being: eitcessively long workweeks 
and rotating, non-circadian-based watch-
bills.2 Based on these findings and com-
bined with earlier research, the Crew 
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Sailors assigned to the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) respond to a simulated fire In the 
hangar bay. Because Navy sailors are responsible for fighting ships, rather than Just oper· 
atlng them, a merchant mariner crew-rest standard should not be completely adopted. 
Endurance Team recommended switch-
ing to circadian-based watchbill fiited 
watchstanding schedules that result in a 
24-hour work/rest day in which a sailor 
works and sleeps at the same time each 
day.l Circadian-based watchbills are as-
sociated with less pronounced split sleep, 
higher alertness, less daytime sleepiness, 
less severe insomnia, better sleep qual-
ity, better mood, and better psychomotor 
vigilance performance.' Sailors working 
on circadian-based watchbills, however, 
were not sleeping more than their peers 
on legacy non-circadian-based watch-
bills; they were sleeping better. This find• 
ing refuted the common argument levied 
against circadian-based watchbills-that 
sailors on those watchbills would have 
fewer hours to work. 
In observing sailors' work sched-
ules, NPS identified a second major root 
cause of sailor fatigue: excessive work-
load and tasking requirements. Sailors 
worked about 12 hours per day, with ap-
pro,cimately 25 percent of them working 
more than 13 hours per day and approiti-
mately JO percent working more than 14 
hours per day.' Fifty percent of sailors 
worked more than 84 hours per week. 
and IO percent worked a staggering 98 
hours or more per week. One reason for 
these long work hours is that some of 
the tasks performed when ships are un-
der way are not fully accounted for by 
Navy manning models.' Yet another rea-
son is that various higher authorities 
each impose requirements on ships, and 
no centralized oversight authority as• 
sesses how the requirements cumula-
tively affect sailor workload.' 
STCW PROVISIONS 
CONTRASTED WITH THE 
CIRCADIAN-BASED WATCHBILL 
EFFORT 
The STCW crew-rest provisions are sim-
ple rules with specific minimum-rest cri-
teria. The STCW provisions do not ad-
dress the root causes of fatigue at sea but 
focus instead on guidelines that are eas-
ily assessed for compliance. By contrast, 
the circadian-based watchbill approach-
integrated in the Navy's Comprehensive 
Fatigue and Endurance Management Pol-
icy (CFEMP)-directly addresses the 
root causes of fatigue at sea, considers 
the specifics of the ship's daily schedule, 
and provides guidance on factors known 
to affect sailor well-being. This approach 
is more holistic and tailored for the 
Navy's operational environment. 
Furthermore, the typical civilian sea-
farer is not subjected to the chronically 
high workload and stress seen in the 
military naval environment. NPS re-
search found that Navy sailors are be-
sieged with persistently high workloads, 
driven by both scheduled tasks and un-
planned events, Even though Navy sail-
ors and seafarers sail the same oceans, 
the daily schedules of Navy and civilian 
vessels differ significantly. Hence, using 
research findings from, and regulations 
optimized for, civilian vessels should be 
done with caution.• 
Notably, the NPS Crew Endurance 
Team recently concluded en assessment 
of the undetwey workload of Navy sail-
ors as compared to various seafarer reg-
ulations, specifically, the Maritime La-
bor Convention, the U.S. Code, and the 
STCW.9 Results showed that Navy sailors 
worked more than the provisions in these 
seafarer regulations on approximately 25 
percent of their workdays, 50 percent of 
any three-day work period, and 80 per-
cent of any seven-day work period. 
The NPS team's findings suggest it 
would be impractical for the Navy to 
adopt the STCW crew-rest provisions at 
the ship level. Dictating rest criteria with-
out addressing the root causes of fatigue 
will not improve crew rest at sea. More 
important, optimizing work/rest pat-
terns by using appropriate watchstand-
ing schedules seems more likely to gener-
ate spare capacity (in terms ofimproved 
alertness, better mood, and better psy-
chomotor vigilance performance), which 
would be available in case of critical op-
erational procedures and emergencies. 
The NPS Crew Endurance Team recom-
mends against adopting the STCW crew-
rest provisions for Navy ships. A better 
approach is to intensify current efforts to 
improve the undeiway daily schedule of 
ships based on the 2017 crew-endurance 
policy change and further optimize un-
deiway workload by reassessing the re-
quirements imposed on ships.'" 
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By Lieutenant Commander Adrian Willing, U.S. Navy Reserve 
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where in the Central Command region. 
To be ready to counter Iranian fast at-
tack craft/fast inshore attack craft (FAC/ 
FIAC) at any time, more joint unit-level 
air operations in maritime surface warfare 
(AOMSW) training should be held in de-
ployed operational environments. 
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